In no uncertain terms, he built the CPG to emphasize the significant changes the Corps must make as part of an operational warfare revolution to advance beyond its paradigm of maneuver warfare and traditional amphibious operations. National Defense Strategy-General Berger catalyzed a new revolution in Marine Corps organizational theory and behavior.

It also recognizes that significant changes in the strategic context of the global operating environment-such as the rise of peer competitors, the erosion of American technological and military advantages, and contested access to global commons-necessitate a return to the Corps’ cultural roots and statutory role as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness to preserve its relevance in “waging great power competition and conflict.” 1īy clearly identifying the sources of this crisis-including an outdated operating concept, a force structure designed for the twentieth-century model of amphibious warfare, and misalignment with the U.S. The CPG describes the Corps’ current crisis as resulting from the cumulative effects of two decades of protracted, limited liability conflict ashore in the post-Cold War era. Marine Corps is not staffed, trained, or equipped for the challenges of the future operating environment.

Berger, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, declared in his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) that the U.S. Keywords: Marine Corps, operational art, naval integration, great power competition, expeditionary warfare, maneuver warfare To do so, the Corps must shed its traditional focus on the tactical level of war and instead embrace operational art to retain enduring relevance during naval campaigns in the context of all-domain, globally integrated operations that span the competition continuum. While materiel and organizational adaptations will play a central role in facilitating this revolution, the Marine Corps must also revise its theoretical approach to operations and its doctrinal hierarchy to generate greater value for the U.S. In catalyzing an operational warfare revolution, the Commandant aims to foster organizational change while realigning the Marine Corps to its role as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. This reality reflects the cumulative effects of protracted conflict ashore and the reemergence of great power competition. Marine Corps is not prepared for the challenges of the future operating environment. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, asserted that the U.S.

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